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United States v. Salvucci: The Problematic
Absence of Automatic Standing
The United States Supreme Court recently abolished the automatic
standing rule in United States v. Salvucci. The author analyzes the diffi-
culties created for the criminal defendant charged with a possessory crime.
In particular, this note focuses on the inequitable position the defendant is
placed in when his suppression hearing testimony is used as a tool to im-
peach subsequent testimony offered at trial. The author continues by
pointing out that the "prosecutorial self-contradiction," sought to be abol-
ished in Salvucci, remains a part of our present judicial system. In conclu-
sion, the author offers several considerations that will necessarily be an
integral part of anyfuture decision regarding the impeachment use of sup-
pression hearing testimony.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the United States Supreme Court created an exception
to the standing requirements for challenging possible violations of
the fourth amendment.' In Jones v. United States,2 the Court cre-
1. One of the most difficult constitutional questions arises when one funda-
mental right is judicially treated so as to infringe upon another. The fourth and
fifth amendments are often the elements of such a conflict. They are, by nature,
both evidentiary. The fourth amendment was designed to protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The fifth amendment provides an individual
with protection against self-incrimination. However, in order to be able to invoke
protection under the fourth amendment, a criminal defendant must establish
fourth amendment "standing." This is established at a pretrial suppression hear-
ing by the defendant's testimony that he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched or the item seized. See W. RiNGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS &
CoNFEssIoNs § 20.5 (2d ed. 1979). When such testimony is self-incriminating, there
arises the situation where the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination is being sacrificed in order to secure his fourth amendment rights.
This conflict is not infrequent. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1066 (3d ed. 1940).
Standing requirements were developed to limit the application of the exclusion-
ary rule to only those who have been "victims" of illegal search or seizure. See,
e.g., AgneUo v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). In that case, the Court reversed
the conviction of a defendant whose house had been illegally searched, but af-
firmed the conviction of his co-defendants. This illustrates the Court's concern in
overextending the applicability of the exclusionary rule. By denying the availabil-
ity of the rule to the co-defendants, the Court restricts its use to those who have
truly been "victims."
The interest required in order to obtain standing in fourth amendment chal-
lenges has been adjusted several times by the courts. See Gaskins v. United
States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (a defendant was denied the opportunity to as-
sert her fourth amendment rights because she was merely a "guest" at the time of
the illegal search). Actual ownership of the house searched was required in Gib-
son v. United States, 419 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The Court found that such
fourth amendment protection did not extend to "co-defendants." A "visitor" has
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ated the "automatic standing rule" 3 a device through which a
criminal defendant, charged with a possessory crime,4 could chal-
lenge the legality of a search and seizure without regard to
whether he had a sufficient interest in the premises searched or
the items seized. The automatic standing rule was limited to pos-
sessory crimes due to the peculiar problem which such crimes
represent. Stated simply, in crimes involving the illegal posses-
sion of an item, standing to object to the admission of the item as
evidence at trial may be obtained only by establishing an interest
in the item. Normally, this interest is established at a pre-trial
hearing on the suppression of such evidence where the defendant
testifies that he did, indeed, possess the item in question. This
same possession is the element that the state must prove in order
to convict the defendant of the possessory crime. Consequently,
the defendant's testimony of possession at the suppression hear-
ing actually constitutes an admission of guilt.5
Automatic standing solved a further dilemma known as
"prosecutorial self-contradiction."6 "Prosecutorial self-contradic-
tion" occurs when the state attempts to take advantage of a con-
flicting predicament. The government asserts that the defendant
possessed the item for purposes of criminal liability, while simul-
taneously asserting that he did not possess the item for standing
purposes. The Jones Court noted that the '"prosecution ... sub-
also been denied the use of the fourth amendment protection in In re Nassetta,
125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942). And finally, another example of this evolution in the
standing requirements is illustrated by Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (the defendant was required to show an infringement of his personal
rights).
Employees, while in "control" or "occupancy" have been determined to lack the
requisite possessory interest in the item seized. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1932). The necessary quantum of interest has been distinguished as
being "ownership in or right to possession of the premises," see, e.g., Jeffers v.
United States, 187 F.2d 496, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aft'd, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
2. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
3. This phrase was coined in the Jones case. Id. The title of the rule is lit-
eral. A criminal defendant in this situation is given standing to suppress evidence
"automatically." The practical effect of this rule is to eliminate the need for any
potentially incriminating testimony at the suppression hearing. The defendant
may proceed to establish the illegality of any evidence that may have been ob-
tained through an unlawful search or seizure.
4. A possessory crime is one in which the very possession of an item or con-
traband is the basis for conviction. The illegal possession of narcotics is one ex-
ample.
5. This is precisely the "dilemma" that was described in Jones.
6. As this term connotes, the prosecution contradicts itself by both granting
and denying possession to the same defendant, in the same case. Possession both
convicts and confers standing. The Court in Jones explained that it would not be
"consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal
justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Govern-
ment." 362 U.S. at 263-64.
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jected the defendant to the penalties meted out to one in lawless
possession while refusing him the remedies designed for one in
that situation."7
The automatic standing rule had the effect of eliminating all
suppression hearing testimony by the defendant. It provided that
the defendant never had to testify prior to trial concerning his in-
terest in the item or premises. This completely eliminated any
possibility of "prosecutorial self-contradiction" when dealing with
possessory crimes. Fifth amendment rights8 were correspond-
ingly protected by preventing the incriminating use of suppres-
sion hearing testimony simply because no suppression hearing
testimony was required or given. Not only did this rule exclude
the use of prior testimony for purposes of establishing guilt at
trial, it also eliminated the use of such testimony for impeach-
ment purposes at trial.9
In 1968, the Supreme Court again addressed the standing issue
in a case which did not involve a possessory crime. In Simmons v.
United States10 the Court held that "when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against
him at trial."" Because of the nature of the crime charged, the
defendant in Simmons was not eligible to invoke the automatic
standing rule of Jones.12 The Court's holding in Simmons elimi-
7. 362 U.S. at 263.
8. Fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination are logically protected
because no testimony is required under the automatic standing rule. The Court in
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), held that it would be "intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert an-
other." Id. at 394.
9. By never having to establish standing, the possessory criminal defendant
never has to offer testimony at a suppression hearing. The first time the defend-
ant takes the stand is at trial to establish that he never possessed the item. With-
out the automatic standing rule, this testimony will most likely be contrary to that
given at a suppression hearing. The prosecution, under such circumstances,
would then be able to impeach the latter testimony due to the inconsistencies.
For a thorough discussion on impeachment, see 2 WHARToN's CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 469 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972).
10. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
11. Id. at 394.
12. The defendant, Garrett, justifiably proceeded on the assumption that the
standing requirement had to be satisfied. He, therefore, offered incriminating tes-
timony. It has been suggested that the adoption of the "police-deterrent" rationale
for the exclusionary rule would logically dictate that a defendant should be able to
object to the admission against him of any unconstitutionally seized evidence.
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); see Comment, Standing to Object
to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CI. L REV. 342 (1967); Note, Stand-
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nated the prejudicial use of suppression hearing testimony for
many purposes.13 An essential issue, however, was ignored in
this decision: would Simmons allow the use of suppression hear-
ing testimony for impeachment purposes? Ever since Simmons,
courts have wrestled with the notion that perhaps the Simmons
case rendered Jones and the automatic standing rule obsolete by
eliminating the "dilemma."14 The impeachment issue continued
to be ignored, at least by the Supreme Court,' 5 until it was ad-
dressed, though not laid to rest, in June of 1980 when the
Supreme Court decided that the Jones doctrine was unnecessary.
In United States v. Salvucci,16 the Court held that the auto-
matic standing rule had "outlived its usefulness in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence."'1 7 As for the impeachment issue, the
majority considered it more appropriate to reserve their decision
on that matter until they were presented with a case specifically
dealing with the "breadth of the Simmon's privilege, and not with
the need for retaining the automatic standing [rule] ."18
ing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 488. However,
this argument to abolish the standing requirement altogether was not advanced in
the Jones or Simmons cases.
13. At least one set of authors has advanced the notion that had the Jones
Court originally adopted a Simmons-type prohibition against subsequent use of
suppression hearing testimony, the result would have ultimately been more bene-
ficial for the judicial system. See Trager and Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing
Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1975). It is suggested
that the Jones Court had two alternatives:
It could have adopted an automatic standing rule, as was done, with the
consequence that standing would sometimes be granted to defendants
who were not victims of fourth amendment violations, or, alternatively it
could have foreclosed the Government from using any testimony given by
a defendant at a suppression hearing on the issue of guilt.
Id. at 428. The latter alternative would create a distinction between successful and
unsuccessful suppression hearing motions.
14. The appellate court that reviewed the case that is the subject of this case-
note observed that the vitality of the Jones doctrine had been challenged in recent
years, but that "[u I ntil the Supreme Court rules on this question, we are not pre-
pared to hold that the automatic standing rule of Jones has been ... over-
ruled .... That is an issue which the Supreme Court must resolve." United
States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1098 (1st Cir. 1979). See, e.g., Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973).
15. Although the issue of impeachment was ignored by the Supreme Court,
there have been a number of courts that have held such testimony admissible as
evidence for impeachment of subsequent testimony. People v. Douglas, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 998, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1977); People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545
(1974); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979). The most significant of
these is Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130, 131-32 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967). But see Cannito v. Sigler, 321 F. Supp. 798 (D.
Nebr. 1971) rev'd 449 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 912 (1972) (court
held that tangible evidence which had been suppressed as the subject of an illegal
search and seizure could not be used to impeach testimony by the defendant).
16. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
17. Id. at 2554.
18. Id. The respondents attempted to show the continued existence of the
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This article examines the history of this judicially created rule,
its present status, and the factors which the Court eventually
must consider in order to make a decision regarding the use of
suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Jones, Simmons, and Salvucci deal with the issue of standing as
it relates to the ability to invoke the exclusionary rule.' 9 The judi-
cially created exclusionary rule basically stands for the proposi-
tion that evidence obtained by violating the defendant's
constitutional rights may not be introduced by the prosecution.
Two theories have been offered concerning the rationale behind
the rule. First, such exclusion will act as a deterrent to violations
of the Constitution, since in many cases the police will have no
motive to conduct an unlawful search if they know that they will
not be able to use its fruits as evidence.20 Secondly, the integrity
of the judicial system requires that the courts are not made par-
ties to "lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
Jones dilemma by showing the risks that were taken in order to obtain their
fourth amendment rights. The Court was obviously not convinced. See note 62 in-
fra, and accompanying text.
19. Language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) suggested for the
first time that evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment rights should
be inadmissible in court. The exclusionary rule saw its origin in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court held that such exclusions of illegally
obtained evidence should be the law. The rule makes any evidence that is ob-
tained in violation of the Constitution, statutes, or court rules completely inadmis-
sible in a court of law. The United States Supreme Court currently enforces an
exclusionary rule in state and federal criminal proceedings as to four major types
of violations: searches and seizures that violate the fourth amendment, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); confessions obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth
amendments, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); identification testimony ob-
tained in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments, United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); and evidence obtained by methods so shocking that its use would
violate the due process clause, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The exclu-
sionary rule is the Supreme Court's sole means for enforcing these vital constitu-
tional rights. The sentiment of the Court toward these rights is best expressed by
the language in Weeks, wherein the Court said that "[t]o sanction such proceed-
ings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defi-
ance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action." 232 U.S. at 394.
20. In Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court stated that the exclu-
sionary rule's "major thrust is a deterrent one and experience has taught that it is
the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that
without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures would be a mere 'form of words."' 392 U.S. at 12. See, e.g., Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such in-
vasions." 21
Although the validity and efficacy of the exclusionary rule is not
at issue here, it is worth noting that the exclusionary rule has
been the subject of many controversial debates. 22 For our pur-
poses, we need only recognize and accept its present status as the
law of our judicial system. 23 As such, it must be dealt with and
observed, and any withdrawal from its use must be done in an or-
derly, logical, and lawful manner. To ignore the rule's authority
and to proceed inconsistently with other judicial precedents is to
create the very "prosecutorial self-contradiction" that the rule
was designed to eliminate.
The text of the fourth amendment contains no limitation on its
availability to the criminal defendant. The Supreme Court has,
however, developed certain standing requirements that act to re-
strict fourth amendment application. In 1925, the Supreme Court
placed a limitation on fourth amendment availability by holding
in Agnello v. United States24 that its application would be re-
stricted to those defendants who had "standing." In other words,
fourth amendment protection extended only to those who had
been "victims" of illegal searches or seizures. 25
The introduction of a standing requirement was the beginning
of a period during which many different applications were devel-
oped. Different jurisdictions created their own versions of stand-
21. 392 U.S. at 13.
22. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). This provides an exhaustive study of the success of the
rule. Oaks concludes that, "[a]s a device for directly deterring illegal searches
and seizures by the police, the exclusionary rule is a failure." Id., at 755.
23. The Supreme Court alluded to the possibility that perhaps the admission
of illegally secured evidence was violative of the constitutional guarantees in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court adopted the rule and it has
remained with our criminal judicial system ever since.
24. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
25. In Jones v. United States, the Court held that ordinarily "it is entirely
proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the ba-
sis for suppressing relevant evidence that he . . .establish, that he himself was
the victim of an invasion of privacy." 362 U.S. at 261. This notion of standing is not
at odds with the automatic standing rule, as demonstrated by the Jones majority-
the authors of automatic standing. It is the method of obtaining this fourth
amendment standing that has caused problems in the past. The procedure prior
to the Jones decision required the defendant to testify in order to establish an in-
terest in the illegally obtained evidence. This, alone, is not objectionable for it is a
rational means of limiting the availability of the exclusionary rule to those who
are truly "victims" of the illegal search and seizure. The objectionable aspect of
this requirement is the fact that this testimony (given in order to obtain the fourth
amendment right) is available for subsequent use that may be quite incriminating
to the defendant. This inequitable situation prompted the Jones decision. For a
complete discussion on suppression hearing standing, see 1 CnmMNAL DEFENSE
TECHmQUES § 4.19 (R. Cipes ed. 1969 & M. Eisenstein ed. Supp. 1979).
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ing.26 This inconsistency recently prompted the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to observe that "the prob-
lem of standing in Fourth Amendment cases has for a considera-
ble period of years been troublesome to courts and
commentators."
27
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure offered
little assistance in defining the ambiguities and inconsistencies
that prevailed. It reads in part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move ... for
the return of ... property ... illegally sezied .... If the motion is
granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in ev-
idence at any hearing or trial.
2 8
In Jones, Justice Frankfurter stated that Rule 41(e) "applies the
general principle that a party will not be heard to claim a consti-
tutional protection unless he 'belongs to the class for whose sake
the constitutional protection is given.' "29 He further stated that a
defendant attempting to challenge evidence against himself on
26. The variety and disparity among the different standing requirements is il-
lustrated by the following cases. In Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (1st Cir.
1928), the court held that a showing that the premises searched were the defend-
ant's dwelling place was required. The fact that the defendant had failed to show
that he owned the contraband seized was also fatal to the defendant's cause.
United States v. Messina, 36 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1929) held that because the casual
workman was not an owner of the premises or a tenant, employee or guest dwell-
ing therein, he lacked the requisite interest to object to any search made of the
premises. A similar holding is found in Chepo v. United States, 46 F.2d 70 (3d Cir.
1930) where the court held that because the defendant had disclaimed interest in a
portion of the premises searched, he could not attack the search. Still another in-
terpretation was presented in Chicco v. United States, 284 F. 434 (4th Cir. 1922).
There, the court found that because the defendant was not the actual owner of the
premises, he could not object to the seizure of any contraband. While these cases
all deal with a certain interest requirement, the degree of interest is not defined in
any of them. One case requires actual ownership while another requires merely
an interest in the premises searched or item seized. Such ambiguity is likely to
produce varying results concerning a basic fundamental right.
27. United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1353 (3d Cir. 1972). The question of
standing is inextricably bound to the philosophical basis of the application of the
exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the fourth amendment. If the primary
purpose of the rule is, as the Supreme Court announced in Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965), deterrence of illegal police conduct, then perhaps the goal
would be best achieved by easing the standing requirements. See Comment,
Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CIm L REV. 342
(1967).
28. FED. R. Cmm. P. 41(e).
29. 362 U.S. at 261 (quoting Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907)). Rule
41(e) did little to clear up the confusion in this area of the law. At most, it intro-
duced the term "a person aggrieved" with which the courts could guide their deci-
sions. However, as is evidenced by Reardon, the courts merely incorporated the
legislative language into their own existing standards.
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fourth amendment grounds had to be "one against whom the
search was directed."30 The Court's language evidenced an at-
tempt to define the inherently ambiguous term "person ag-
grieved."
Aside from the confusion and uncertainty that prevailed in this
area, there arose an even greater difficulty. The problem existed
in the peculiar context of possessory crimes. In order to establish
the aforementioned standing, a defendant charged with a posses-
sory crimehad to testify that he had an interest 31 in the property
seized or in the premises searched.32 Consequently, a defendant
seeking to comply with what had become the conventional stand-
ing requirement, was "forced to allege facts the proof of which
would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him."33 Judge
Learned Hand spoke of this "dilemma" in Connolly v. Medalie.34
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession,
of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a pos-
sessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If
they come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to
cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that pre-
dicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.
3 5
30. 362 U.S. at 261. This is known as the "target theory" of standing. As the
term suggests, standing was conferred upon the party against whom the search
was targeted. This theory required a finding by the court, based upon warrant affl-
davits and police testimony, of the precise party against whom the search was
designed.
This theory, however, was subsequently rejected in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the "so-called
'target' theory ... would in effect permit a defendant to assert that a violation of
the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party entitled him to have evidence sup-
pressed at his trial." 439 U.S. at 133. In view of the reluctance that the Court has
to extend standing, such a rejection of the target theory is understandable. See
note 32 infra.
31. See note 4 supra.
32. 362 U.S. at 261. The Court said that in order "[tlo establish 'standing',
Courts of Appeals have generally required that the movant claim. . . to have had
a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched." Id. The Court then
gave an example using narcotics as the possessed item. Since the indictment and
conviction both would be established by proving that the defendant possessed the
narcotics, anything the defendant said to establish his possession, according to the
standing requirements, would aid the prosecution in their case.
33. 362 U.S. at 262. The Court presents the notion that requiring the defendant
to assert possession in a trial where he will be trying to deny possession, operates
to encourage the defendant to perjure himself if he seeks to establish 'standing'
while maintaining a defense to the charge of possession." Id.
34. 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). In Connolly, a night watchman was arrested pur-
suant to the National Prohibition Act for being present when police officers raided
a brewery. They had no search warrant and no probable cause to search without
one. The night watchman was held not to be a "person aggrieved" under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. For a general discussion on the parameters of stand-
ing under Rule 41(e), see 5 L. ORELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES § 41:52 (1967).
35. 58 F.2d at 630. The language presented here indicates an intolerance on
the Court's part toward defendants who refuse to establish their standing in fear
1052
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By definition, a possessory crime is one in which the govern-
ment is asserting possession on the part of the defendant. In
cases "where the indictment itself charges possession, the de-
fendant in a very real sense is revealed as a 'person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure' upon a motion to suppress evi-
dence prior to trial."36 "Prosecutorial self-contradiction" results
under these circumstances: the defendant is told that his posses-
sion was illegal while also being told that he did not possess the
illegal item for standing purposes.
In 1960, the Supreme Court sought to remedy this situation with
their decision in Jones v. United States.3 7 The Court in that case
held that a defendant had "automatic standing" 38 to challenge the
legality of the search. The Court noted that "to hold to the con-
trary... would be to permit the Government to have the advan-
tage of contradictory positions as a basis for conviction."39
The effect of the automatic standing rule was to completely
eliminate any possibility of using suppression hearing testimony
at trial, simply because there was never any suppression hearing
testimony to use. Immediately upon being indicted for a posses-
sory offense, the defendant became a "person aggrieved" under
Rule 41(e). The Jones rule, however, only applied to possessory
crimes, leaving future conflicts 4O involving other types of crimes
of incriminating themselves. This, again, suggests the idea of one constitutional
right being employed at the expense of another.
36. 362 U.S. at 264. Regardless of the defendant's interest in the premises or
item, when one is being charged with the possession of an illegal item, he is defi-
nitely a "person aggrieved" in the sense that the statute is operating against him.
When an illegal search occurs and evidence is consequently produced, who else is
aggrieved by such a search if not the person who is being indicted and convicted
because of it?
37. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the defendant was present in an apartment
that was rented by a friend who permitted him to use it. He moved to suppress
evidence that was seized from that apartment on the ground that the search was
illegal.
38. See note 3 supra.
39. 362 U.S. at 263. The Court's rationale on this point is quite clear. The de-
fendant's conviction is a result of his possession at the time of the search and yet
the contraband was admitted into evidence on the ground that the defendant did
not have possession of the narcotics at that time. To base a conviction on such a
contradiction would be ridiculous.
40. The future conflicts mentioned here could involve any evidence that was
illegally obtained in crimes that do not involve possession. In the case of a mur-
der, the most significant piece of evidence, a weapon, could be obtained through a
violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. In order to object to the in-
troduction of such evidence, the defendant has to establish an interest in the
weapon that might well lead to his conviction. The Jones automatic standing did
1053
open to possibility. Such a conflict was presented in Simmons v.
United States.41
In Simmons, because the defendant was not charged with a
possessory crime, he was required to establish standing to chal-
lenge the seized evidence. 42 At the suppression hearing he ac-
cordingly testified that a suitcase containing incriminating
evidence of a bank robbery was his. 43 The Court observed that
"[wiithout his testimony, the Government might have found it
hard to prove that he was the owner of the suitcase."44 The Court
seemed even more impressed by the fact that if the motion was
unsuccessful, a defendant would be "assuming the risk that the
testimony would later be admitted against him at trial."45 The
Court continued, "[i]n these circumstances, we find it intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in or-
der to assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant
testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence... his testi-
mony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial. ..."46
The Simmons ruling effectively resolved the problem presented
to the Court. Its scope seemed to adequately eliminate the di-
lemma that was recognized by the Jones court. It appeared as
though everything the automatic standing rule did, the Simmons
decision could do, and do better. Better, because its application
was not narrowly defined. Jones applied only to possessory
crimes whereas Simmons was available to all criminal defend-
ants. The criminal defendant could now freely testify in a pretrial
suppression hearing without the threat of having that testimony
used against him at trial. However, there remained unanswered a
very important question: while suppression hearing testimony
was generally made unavailable to the prosecution, would it also
apply to the use of such testimony for impeachment purposes?47
not preclude such an incident from occurring, since the Jones rule only applied to
possessory crimes, and murder is not a possessory crime.
41. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
42. Id. at 390. The defendant in Simmons justifiably proceeded on the as-
sumption that he had to satisfy the traditional standing requirement, that of estab-
lishing an interest in the item seized. By doing so, however, he was incriminating
himself in a very real sense. See note 52 infra.
43. 390 U.S. at 391.
44. Id. The government concedes that there were no identifying marks on the
outside of the suitcase. 390 U.S. at 391 n.14.
45. Id. at 391. Such a situation was "highly prejudicial," and was not tolerated.
Although the Court had provided in Jones that evidence thus obtained in a posses-
sory crime was unlawful, there appears to be no logical distinction between the
prejudicial situations presented by the Jones and Simmons case. Therefore, the
conclusions are consistent and the outcomes equally protective of fourth and fifth
amendment rights.
46. Id. at 394.
47. At this stage it is well to look at Jones and Simmons in juxtaposition and
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The automatic standing rule had precluded any such use. By
not requiring suppression hearing testimony in order to establish
fourth amendment standing, there was never any testimony given
with which the prosecution could impeach subsequent testimony.
The Simmons ruling, however, resurrected the suppression hear-
ing testimony requirement and left the prosecution free to use
such testimony for impeachment purposes.
Subsequent cases reflected the uncertainty as to the continued
validity of the Jones automatic standing rule; however, no court
was willing to hold that Jones was no longer valid.48 Even the
Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to abolish the auto-
matic standing rule. In Brown v. United States,49 the Court lim-
ited the dimensions of the automatic standing rule to fact
patterns similar to Jones, those in which possession "at the time
see how their holdings interrelate. The most obvious distinction is the application
of the two decisions. Jones very narrowly applies to possessory crimes whereas
Simmons applies to all crimes. The question most commonly presented about the
two was whether Simmons overruled Jones. See note 54 infra. The obvious alter-
native was that the two rules coexisted in equal importance and necessity.
Consider the cases of two defendants A and B. A is indicted on the charges of
illegal possession of narcotics, a possessory crime. Under the Jones rule, he is not
required to offer any testimony in order to obtain standing to object to any evi-
dence. Therefore, there is no testimony to use at trial for any purposes. Under
Simmons, however, the same defendant is required to testify. While this testi-
mony may not be used at trial, the testimony is valuable for other purposes. See
note 68 infra. B, on the other hand, is indicted on a nonpossessory crime. Under
Simmons, he is affected much like A is, but in the case of nonpossessory crime,
there is little reason for the defendant to take the stand at trial. For possessory
crimes it is essential to take the stand and testify in order to establish nonposses-
sion. When A does so, his subsequent testimony will be impeached by the prior
testimony.
The question this raises is clear. Why couldn't Jones and Simmons coexist in
our judicial system in order to grant the full spectrum of protection for both pos-
sessory and nonpossessory crimes? There is nothing in one case that contradicts
the other as far as standing is concerned.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Groner, 494 F.2d 499 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Cotham, 363 F. Supp. 851, (W.D. Tex. 1973).
49. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). It is not clear why the Court has been so dissatisfied
with the Jones automatic standing rule. In Broum, the Court expressed a discom-
fort with its continued validity but refused to overrule it. 411 U.S. at 228. The rea-
soning, in view of the subsequent use of testimony for impeachment purposes, is
fallacious. This becomes apparent with the Court's language in Brown. "[W]e do
not decide that this vice of prosecutional self-contradiction warrants the continued
survival of Jones' 'automatic' standing now that our decision in Simpson has re-
moved the danger of coerced self-incrimination. We simply see no reason to afford
such 'automatic' standing where, as here, there was no risk to a defendant of ei-
ther self-incrimination or prosecutorial self-contradiction." 411 U.S. at 229. Such
coerced self-incrimination has not been removed entirely. See note 76, infra.
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of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential element of the
offense... charged.' "50 Chief Justice Burger went on to say that
the Court was not ready to decide whether or not the "vice of
prosecutorial self-contradiction warrants the continued survival of
the Jones 'automatic standing' now that our decision in Simmons
has removed the danger of coerced self-incrimination." 51 Re-
flected in this statement is the general feeling that Simmons had
rendered Jones obsolete.
It was not until June 25, 1980 that the Supreme Court decided
that the Jones doctrine was, indeed, dead. In United States v.
Salvucci, the respondents were charged with unlawful possession
of stolen mail, a possessory crime that fell within the narrow ap-
plication of the Jones rule as defined by Brown. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's finding that since the crime was
possessory in nature, the defendants were not required to estab-
lish standing in order to challenge the illegally seized evidence. 52
The appellate court observed, however, that the automatic stand-
ing rule had been challenged in recent years, but they, like so
many other courts had done on this issue, decided that "[u]ntil
the Supreme Court rules on this question, we are not prepared to
hold that the automatic standing rule of Jones has been ... over-
ruled .... That is an issue which the Supreme Court must re-
solve."5 3
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackula, were charged
in a federal indictment with twelve counts of unlawful possession
of stolen mail, a possessory crime. The checks that formed the
basis of the indictment had been seized by police during a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant, of an apartment rented by
Zackula's mother.
Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the
50. Id. at 228 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390). See note 11
supra.
51. Id. at 229.
52. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1979). This decision was based on
the then valid automatic standing rule, as the facts of the case were a classical ex-
ample of a case calling for the application of the rule. See text accompanying
notes 54 & 55 infra.
53. 599 F.2d at 1098. See note 54 supra. The only explanation for this contin-
ued hesitance to decide on the status of the automatic standing rule is judicial
prudence. No lower court is willing to overrule a creation of their judicial superi-
ors, and likewise, the Supreme Court is usually reluctant to overrule any of its
own prior law. During this period of flux, it appears as though both the Simmons
-rule and the Jones rule coexisted and operated in conjunction with one another.
In none of the opinions during that time, presented herein, were there expressions
of detrimental efforts resulting from this coexistence.
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ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the search
warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause. The dis-
trict court granted the motion.5 4 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding, in reliance on Jones v. United States that since respon-
dents were charged with crimes of possession, they were entitled
to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the
search without regard to whether they had an expectation of pri-
vacy in the premises searched.55
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehn-
quist, began its analysis by commending the court of appeals in
its observation that while the Jones doctrine operated to provide
the respondents with automatic standing, its validity had been
"challenged in recent years."56 The Court then labeled the Jones
rule as "an exception to the general rule," 57 illustrated by the
Brown case.5 8 The rationale behind the creation of this exception
was that "It]he Court found that the prosecution of such posses-
sory offenses presented a 'special problem' which necessitated
the departure from the then-settled principles of Fourth Amend-
ment 'standing.' "59 Justice Rehnquist proceeded to recite the
two-point rationale for the automatic standing rule as given in
Jones. "First, the Court found that in order to establish standing
at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant would often
be forced to allege facts . . . which would tend. . . to convict him
.. .. "60 and secondly, "[wlithout a rule prohibiting a government
challenge to a defendant's 'standing' to invoke the exclusionary
rule in a possessory offense prosecution, the government would
be allowed the 'advantage of contradictory positions.'"61
54. 100 S. Ct. at 2549 n.1.
55. 599 F.2d at 1098. This application of the automatic standing rule was an en-
tirely proper one. The crime charged was possessory in nature and the defendants
were attempting to establish standing in a pretrial suppression hearing.
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2550.
57. Id.
58. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). The narrowing effect of the Broum case on the auto-
matic standing rule shows the Court's dissatisfaction with the rule's operation.
Where once the Jones rule was the general rule, the Court expressed its frustra-
tion by diminishing its validity to the "exception" status, and finally to obsoletion.
Once again, the reason is not clear.
59. 100 S. Ct. at 2550, suggesting that the "special problem" no longer exists.
60. Id. at 2551 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 262).
61. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 269). See note 12 supra.
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However, the Jones premise and the "two reasons which led the
Court to the rule of automatic standing have ... been affected by
time" claimed Justice Rehnquist.62 This, he explained was largely
due to the decision in Simmons, where the Court held that "testi-
mony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress
cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial."63 Other de-
velopments concerning fourth amendment standing "clarify that a
prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that
a defendant charged with possession of a seized item did not have
a privacy interest violated in the course of the search and
seizure."64 These factors convinced the Court that "not only the
original tenets of the Jones decision have eroded, but also that no
alternative principles exist to support retention of the rule."65
The dismissal of any possible alternative reason for retaining the
automatic standing rule was re-emphasized when Rehnquist af-
firmed that the "dilemma identified in Jones, . was eliminated
by our decision in Simmons v. United States."66
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2551.
63. Id. As discussed earlier, Simmons may or may not have abrogated any ne-
cessity for the automatic standing rule. One thing is certain, however, Simmons
did not provide the protection against subsequent uses of testimony as did the
Jones rule. It appears as though "time", as suggested by Justice Rehnquist, is not
the changing factor at all, rather the Simmons decision promulgated any needed
change.
64. Id. This latest adjustment in the requisite interest for conferring standing
is an attempt to eliminate the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction." The Court
in Salvucci relies on a companion case, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556
(1980). Since possession both convicted and conferred standing, the Supreme
Court eliminated the logical inconsistency by substituting a possessory interest
with a new interest requirement. Now a defendant may only assert a fourth
amendment claim if he has a privacy interest in the area that was searched.
The Rawlings Court bases its decision on an earlier Supreme Court case, Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), where the Court held that when a fourth amendment
objection is based on an interest in the property searched, the defendant must
show an actual invasion of privacy. No fourth amendment claim based on an in-
terest in the property seized was before the Court. Consequently, the Court could
not have logically concluded that a defendant must show a privacy interest in the
items seized; and yet they did. As Marshall says in his dissent, "[t]he [Rawlings]
decision ... is not supported by the only case directly cited in its favor." 100 S.
Ct. at 2566 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2551.
66. Id. Consider the criminal defendant charged with a possessory crime. As
the law now provides, subsequent to Salvucci, the only available protection
against incriminating use of standing testimony is through the Simmons holding.
Now that the automatic standing rule is no longer available, he must testify that
he had a possessory (perhaps even a privacy) interest in the item seized or the
place searched. For our purposes, let us assume that the defendant is, indeed, in-
nocent. Although Simmons prohibits the use of this testimony against the defend-
ant directly at trial, the defendant's credibility may be all but destroyed by the
prosecution when the defendant attempts to establish his innocence by testifying
at trial. There is nothing to prevent the state from impeaching the defendant's tes-
timony. The only safeguard that was ever designed to prevent this inequity was
the automatic standing rule.
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The Court then addressed itself to a contention made by the re-
spondents. The respondents asserted that the Jones dilemma was
not entirely abolished by the Simmons decision by noting that al-
though Simmons "eliminated the possibility that the prosecutor
could use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as
substantive evidence of guilt at trial, Simmons did not eliminate
other risks to the defendant which attach to giving testimony at a
suppression hearing, [pJrincipally . . . that the prosecutor may
still be permitted to use the defendant's testimony to impeach
him at trial. '67
Despite these contentions presented by the respondents, the
Supreme Court considered it more appropriate to dismiss the is-
sue for two reasons. First, the Court claimed that it "has not de-
cided whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant's
testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at
trial."68 In essence, the Court told the defense that their conten-
tion was unfounded because the Court had never decided that the
use of suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes
would be permitted. According to the majority's opinion, the im-
peachment question was not at issue in this case. The second
reason given was that the impeachment issue was one which
"more aptly relates to the proper breadth of the Simmons privi-
lege, and not to the need for retaining automatic standing."69
67. 100 S. Ct. at 2554.
68. Id. While this may be technically true, the Supreme Court has indeed ac-
quiesced to such practice by lower courts. See note 21 supra. Several lower
courts have held that suppression hearing testimony is admissible as evidence for
impeachment purposes. Perhaps the most significant of these is Woody v. United
States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1967). It is worth noting that the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari. 389 U.S. 961 (1967). In Woody, Chief Justice Burger, then a mem-
ber of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, found that in order to
promote honesty in trial proceedings, criminal defendants would be held account-
able for their prior inconsistent statements. He states that "if an accused testifies
in a non-jury hearing to suppress evidence, his testimony at that hearing may be
used, at the very least, to impeach later contrary statements." 379 F.2d at 132.
While no one can argue with the premise of Burger's statement, that of promot-
ing honesty in trial proceedings, the situation in fourth amendment standing is not
directly analogous. A defendant is forced to testify that he did possess the item,
even though he may not have, just to be able to object to its admissibility at trial.
It is not as though he was intentionally deceiving the court, rather, he is merely
following the instructions of the court as to the method of obtaining fourth amend-
ment standing. See note 74 infra.
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2554. It is somewhat perplexing to understand how the Court
reached this conclusion. The decision in Salvucci directly relates to the issue of
impeachment. After all, it was the Jones decision, which was overruled by the
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Apparently, the Court thought it best to postpone any determi-
nation regarding the use of such testimony for impeachment pur-
poses. Any such determination would be reserved for a case
which would directly address the breadth of the Simmons case.
By so deciding, the Court must have believed that the protections
provided by Simmons were adequate enough to compensate for
the absence of the Jones automatic standing rule. In other words,
it is presumed that the Court would not intentionally leave the
criminal defendant without the rights afforded him through the
automatic standing rule, unless the Court was certain that Sim-
mons had, indeed, eliminated the Jones dilemma.
V. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS
A. The Impeachment Issue
The respondent's contentions were dismissed after a determi-
nation by the Court that any decision regarding the use of sup-
pression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes would be
better left to a case that directly addressed the issue. When this
opportunity presents itself,70 the Supreme Court will not be with-
out significant guidelines in making their decision.
Perhaps the clearest of these guidelines is the Court's holding
in Miranda v. Arizona.7 1 Prior to Miranda, there appears to have
been a distinction drawn between two types of incriminating evi-
dence: actual use of prior testimony and the use of prior testi-
mony for impeachment purposes. 7 2 Miranda ostensibly
eliminated any possible distinction between the two:
No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confes-
sions and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part of all of an of-
fense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not
Salvucci Court, that provided the only protection against the use of suppression
hearing testimony for impeachment purposes.
Here, however, the majority nominates Simmons to be the applicable decision to
address the impeachment issue. Simmons never mentioned impeachment.
70. It seems highly likely that the Court will be presented with such a case
before too much time has elapsed, since the automatic standing rule is no longer
available. Consequently, criminal defendants will be attempting to establish
standing by testifying that they had an interest in the property, and the prosecu-
tion will undoubtedly attempt to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial that
contradicts his suppression hearing testimony. It is entirely possible that the
Salvucci case itself will return to the Supreme Court on this very point.
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda involved a series of cases that all addressed
the issue of the admissibility of certain evidence that may have been obtained in
violation of fifth amendment rights.
72. This point is illustrated by the Simmons case. The Court felt that actual
use of the defendant's testimony given at a suppression hearing was violative of
his fifth amendment rights. However, the use of that same testimony for impeach-
ment purposes was neither expressly nor impliedly prohibited by the Court.
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distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same
reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and
statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory'. . . [s]tatements merely in-
tended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his
testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word .... 73
Miranda represents the notion that any defendant's statement,
including statements used for purposes of impeachment, must be
obtained pursuant to lawful conduct by those obtaining the state-
ments.7 4 In Salvucci, the Court saw Simmons as being adequate
protection against the misuse of suppression hearing testimony,
and yet the use of such testimony to impeach would be equally as
prejudicial against the defendant as would any other use of the
testimony. The subsequent use of suppression hearing testimony
for purposes of impeachment would certainly be "incriminating in
any meaningful sense of the word."75 Miranda, applied in this
context by analogy, would serve to abolish any distinction be-
tween actual testimony that would incriminate, and the mere use
of suppression hearing testimony for purposes of impeachment.
The fact that statements used to impeach may be reliable does
not make them any less prejudicial to the defendant. Nor is relia-
bility a ground for permitting the use of such statements to im-
peach if their use is otherwise improper and prejudicial to the
defendant.7 6 This is clear from the Supreme Court holding in
Harrison v. United States.7 7 In that case, certain evidence was
held to be inadmissible on retrial.78 When the prosecution then
73. 384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis added). See Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d
387 (D.C. Cir. 1968). -
74. It could be argued that since suppression hearing testimony is made vol-
untarily, it is reliable under conventional rules against self-incrimination. See
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). However, as Simmons pointed out, "[a] defend-
ant is 'compelled' to testify in support of a motion to suppress only in the sense
that if he refrains from testifying he will have to forego a benefit .... 390 U.S. at
393-94.
75. See note 79 infra.
76. See note 80 infra.
77. 392 U.S. 219 (1968). In Harrison, due to the mistaken conduct of his attor-
ney, the defendant offered testimony that would not otherwise have been re-
quired. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction.
78. On retrial, the prosecutor read to the jury the petitioner's previous trial
testimony (placing petitioner, shotgun in hand, at the scene of the killing), which
was admitted into evidence over petitioner's objection that he had been induced to
testify at the prior trial only because of the introduction against him of the inad-
missible confessions. Defendant's counsel naturally put the defendant on the
stand to rebut the confessions. As might be expected, there was substantial differ-
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attempted to use the same evidence for impeachment purposes,
the Court frustrated the prosecution's efforts. The reasoning is
consistent with Miranda; once evidence is declared inadmissible
because it was unlawfully obtained, it will also be unavailable for
impeachment purposes. While the case was decided on the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine, 79 it seems obvious that its applica-
tion should be extended into the context of suppression hearing
testimony.
Although Simmons never addressed the impeachment issue, its
reasoning is evident. The Court found it unconscionable to put a
criminal defendant in a position where he was "obliged either to
give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid
Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination .... [W] e find it
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surren-
dered in order to assert another."8 0
The logical extension of these cases is clear. Miranda identifies
the use of unlawfully obtained statements to impeach to be self-
incriminating in "any sense of the word."8 1 By doing so, it ren-
ders invalid any distinction between the use of the statements to
establish guilt directly and the use of statements to impeach.
Harrison prohibits the state from taking advantage of evidence
ence between the confessions and the retrial testimony. On grant of certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that petitioner's testimony in the former trial was inadmissi-
ble in the later proceeding because it was the fruit of the illegally procured confes-
sion. 392 U.S. at 222-26.
79. Id. at 222. The testimony that was held to be inadmissible was given under
the mistaken assumption that it was required to rebut the confessions admitted
into evidence. The Court viewed the testimony to have been under less than vol-
untary circumstances, consequently it was inadmissible for any and all purposes.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine stands for the rule of law that makes
any appendage of illegal evidence also illegal. In other words, even if the presen-
tation of certain evidence into court is not illegal per se, if it is the product, or the
"fruit" of illegally obtained evidence, it is equally inadmissible. See 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: § 11.4 (1978).
80. 390 U.S. at 394. "The rationale that statements should be excluded from ev-
idence when obtained while the defendant is being encouraged by the state to ac-
cept an alternative procedure to his constitutional right of trial receives indirect
support in two recent Supreme Court decisions. In Harrison v. United States, [see
note 77 supra] the Court held that when a new trial is granted because illegally
obtained confessions were introduced against the defendant, the state cannot sub-
sequently use defendant's testimonial admissions of the first trial. . . . In Sim-
mon v. United States, [see note 10 supra] the Court held that statements made
by a defendant during a hearing on an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence,
allegedly seized in violation of the fourth amendment, cannot be used against him
at trial. The Court reasoned that a defendant should in no way be deterred from
seeking his constitutional rights, and it would be grossly unjust if he had to waive
his privilege against self-incrimination to obtain them." Bagley, Improvident
Guilty Pleas and Related Statements: Inadmissible Evidence at Later Trial, 6
CRim. L. BULL. 3, 18-19 (1970) (emphasis added).
81. See note 80 supra.
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held to be inadmissible. Simmons precludes the possibility of
surrendering one fundamental right while merely trying to assert
another. These Supreme Court holdings dictate a conclusion that
evidence, procured either through an illegal search and seizure or
under the guise of a suppression hearing, may not be used to es-
tablish guilt directly or for impeachment purposes should the de-
fendant decide to take the stand at trial.
This is undoubtedly the conclusion that Justice Marshall would
have reached, as is indicated by his dissent in Salvucci. He notes
that although the Court held in Brown v. United States that Sim-
mons provided complete protection against the "self-incrimina-
tion dilemma ... [tjhe use of testimony for impeachment
purpose would subject a defendant to precisely the same di-
lemma, unless he was prepared to relinquish his constitutional
right to testify in his own defense, and would thereby create a
strong deterrent to asserting Fourth Amendment claims." 82 The
dissenting Justice continues by stating that the majority's deci-
sion in Salvucci frustrates the very purpose of Jones and Sim-
mons: the removal of such obstacles to the free exercise of
constitutional rights.83
B. The Tactical Advantage
A final significant factor that must be considered before any de-
termination can be made concerning impeachment is the tremen-
dous tactical advantage that the present situation provides for the
prosecution. The Court noted in United States v. Havens,84 that:
[a]lthough evidence of prior inconsistent utterances or behavior may os-
tensibly be offered merely to attack a defendant's credibility by contra-
dicting his trial testimony, such evidence can also serve to buttress the
affirmitive elements of the prosecution's case. Thus, almost any time an
accused takes the stand, the prosecution will have an opportunity to en-
hance its case in chief. And it is unrealistic to assume that limiting in-
82. 100 S. Ct. at 2555 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 228).
83. Id.
84. 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980). The quoted text is a portion of Justice Brennan's
dissent to a decision which greatly impaired a defendant's fifth amendment rights.
The Court in Havens held that where a defendant's statements were made in re-
sponse to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by defendant's direct
examination, they are subject to otherwise proper impeachment. Justice Brennan
characterized this decision as being an "unwarranted departure from prior con-
trolling cases . . . another element in the trend to depreciate the constitutional
protections guaranteed the criminally accused." 100 S. Ct. at 1917 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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structions will afford the defendant significant protection.8 5
Justice Marshall also expressed concern that with the removal
of the Jones protection, "the opportunity for cross-examination at
the suppression hearing may enable the prosecutor to elicit in-
criminating information beyond that offered on direct examina-
tion to establish the requisite Fourth Amendment interest."86
Further, he claims that "[e]ven if such information could not be
introduced at the subsequent trial, it might be helpful to the pros-
ecution in developing its case or deciding its trial strategy."87 Fi-
nally, Justice Marshall observes that "[tihe furnishing of such a
tactical advantage to the prosecution should not be the price of
asserting a Fourth Amendment claim."88
Simmons truly would have rendered the automatic standing
rule obsolete if it were not for the significant tactical opportuni-
ties that the use of suppression hearing testimony to impeach of-
fers the prosecution. Because these tactical advantages exist, the
abolition of the Jones rule puts a criminal defendant in a very in-
equitable position.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci chose not to
decide the impeachment issue, preferring to wait until a case was
presented which directly addressed the question. Until such
time, it appears that the criminal defendant, charged with a pos-
sessory crime, is saddled with the same "dilemma" that the
Supreme Court set out to eliminate over twenty years ago.89 In
short, "criminal defendants . . . no longer have the unfettered
right to elect whether or not to testify in their own behalf."90 For
if they chose to testify, that testimony will be entirely available to
the prosecution for impeachment purposes at trial.
In view of the cases discussed herein, and the fact that such a
tremendous advantage is now given to the prosecution, the equi-
table decision would be one in which the use of suppression hear-
ing testimony for impeachment is prohibited. This result would
be consistent with the long-standing philosophy of the Court an-
nounced in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States:9 1 "The es-
sence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
85. Id. at 1919 n.2.
86. 100 S. Ct. at 2555.
87. Id. See note 91 infra.
88. 100 S. Ct. at 2555.
89. The Jones decision was decided in 1960.
90. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1917 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
91. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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certain way is that not merely evidence as acquired shall not be
used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all."92
WiLLLAM C. BOLLARD
92. 251 U.S. at 392 (emphasis a~ded).
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